Jack Dennerlein, PhD Harvard University
Boston, MA
Ph: 617-384-8812
Email: jax@hsph.harvard.edu
Abstract:
This proposed research project addresses the question; does adding a positive affirmation of safe practices (leading indicators) through an employee incentive-reward program improve the effectiveness of a well established safety program? Safety culture within the construction industry has many challenges, especially the distributed work force in an ever physically changing environment. One approach that has been used to change safety attitudes and behaviors is employee incentive based programs. To date no program has been evaluated with a comparison group and reported in the literature. Therefore, we, along with our partnership with the Harvard University Construction Services Group, propose to complete a randomized control trial intervention study of a safe working conditions incentive program. During this study, we will compare programs that are based on leading indicators (safe working conditions) and programs based on lagging indicators (injury and incident outcomes).
The overall project goal will be accomplished through the following specific aims: (1) We will develop a progressive incentive program that rewards workers, foremen, site supervisors and project managers for achieving a certain performance on safe work conditions (leading indicators of safety) as measured with a safety inspection tool and performance monitoring system within their groups (Year 1). In addition, we will track the safety performance metrics and analyze temporal patterns of safety performance in order to set specific criteria for the incentive reward system. (2) We will pilot test the system on two small worksites at Harvard University and refine the system based on the experience of completing the pilot tests (Year 1 and 2). (3) We will complete a randomized control intervention study on eight large scale construction projects with the novel incentive program structure, based on leading indicators, randomly assigned to four sites and conventional no-injury reporting incentive program (lagging indicators) as a control at the other sites (Years 2-5).
